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Abstract
This paper provides a welfare comparison of a tariff with a combination
of a production subsidy to, and a commodity tax on, an import-competing
commodity in a two-country economy. We treat some plausible situations
of industry protection, including where the initial tariff is above the op-
timal tariff, where a certain output level of a tariff-imposed commodity
must be maintained, and where there is positive externality of its domes-
tic production. In those cases we explore the optimal combination of the
production subsidy and the commodity tax and show it to be superior to
the tariff from the welfare viewpoint.
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1 Introduction
A tariff is a typical policy that is aimed to protect a particular industry from
foreign imports.1 For example, Japan currently imposes high tariffs on various
agricultural products for producer protection, e.g., 1705% on konjac, 1083% on
pea, 778% on rice, 593% on peanut and 482% on butter. However, it comes
under mounting pressure in the regime of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Recent conclusions
of various free trade agreements (FTAs) and economic partnership agreements
(EPAs) have also accelerated tariff reductions. An alternative policy of industry
protection is a production subsidy. For example, Korea implemented an agricul-
ture compensation system when it concluded an FTA with the US. Production
subsidies to agricultural sectors in the US and the European Union (EU) amount
to around 20 and 70 billion dollars per year, respectively. Noting the expanding
importance of such policy changes, we analyze the welfare effect of a replacement
of a protective tariff by a production subsidy with a commodity tax. In partic-
ular, we compare the welfare effect of a tariff with that of a combination of a
production subsidy and a commodity tax when these policies are carried out for
the purpose of industry production, and explore the optimal protection policy.2
It is well known that a tariff attains higher welfare than a production subsidy
when the country has monopoly power in trade (Bhagwati, 1971). However, if a
certain degree of industry protection is required, the superiority of a tariff over a
production subsidy may be ambiguous. This paper presents a welfare comparison
between a tariff and a combination of a production subsidy and a commodity tax
in such likely cases as where in an import-competing sector a very high protective
tariff is imposed, a certain production level must be maintained, or domestic
production of the sector yields some positive externality.
The literature on the optimal tariff is substantial (see, for example, Kaldor,
1940; Graaff, 1949—50; Johnson, 1951—1952; Kemp, 1967; Kennan and Riezman,
1988; Bond, 1990; Lahiri and Ono, 1999; Syropoulos, 2002). However, all of them
lack the viewpoint of industry protection. Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) and
Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969) assume general domestic distortions
and point out the possibility that commodity and production tax-cum-subsidies
increase welfare but do not explicitly discuss their optimal levels. We fill this
void and analyze the optimal combination of the production subsidy to, and
the commodity tax on, the import-competing sector when the sector has to be
protected.
After confirming that a tariff is equivalent to a combination of a production
1Even now, a tariff is a primary source of government revenue in many developing countries.
2Corden (1957) intuitively discussed a production subsidy and a commodity tax as protection
policy using a graphical analysis.
2
subsidy and a commodity tax with the same magnitude as the tariff, we first ex-
plore the optimal commodity tax and the optimal production subsidy when they
can take different magnitudes. We then examine the welfare effect of replacing
the tariff by the combination of the production subsidy and the commodity tax
that realizes the same degree of protection. This conversion is found to make the
home country better off when the preimposed tariff is higher than the optimal
tariff. It may apply to the case of the Japanese rice protection because the 778%
tariff must exceed the optimal rate. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to such
cases as where the commodity tax and the production subsidy are chosen so that
the tariff-protected industry maintains a certain level of production and where
there is production externality, and show the same property to hold.
2 The Model
We consider a standard 2 × 2 × 2 general equilibrium competitive model. The
home country exports commodity 1 and imports commodity 2. There are two
production factors, labor L and capital K, which are fixed in supply and in-
ternationally immobile. The home country imposes a commodity tax (t) and a
production subsidy (s) on commodity 2, while the foreign country imposes neither
tariffs nor tax-cum-subsidies.
The production function of sector i (i = 1, 2) in the home country is
yi = fi(ki)Li, f
0
i > 0 and f
00
i < 0, i = 1, 2, (1)
where yi is output of commodity i, Li and Ki are respectively labor and capital
inputs in sector i, and ki ≡ Ki/Li. The home firms’ optimization behavior leads
to
f 01(k1) = (s+ p)f
0
2(k2) = r,
f1(k1)− f 01(k1)k1 = (s+ p) [f2(k2)− f 02(k2)k2] = w, (2)
where p is the world price of commodity 2, r is the capital rent, w is the wage
rate and commodity 1 is taken as numeraire. From (2) we derive
r = r(s+ p), w = w(s+ p), ki = ki(s+ p), i = 1, 2. (3)
The factor market equilibrium conditions in the home country are
L1 + L2 = L and k1L1 + k2L2 = K, (4)
where L and K are the home endowments of the two factors respectively. Equa-
tions (1), (3) and (4) give the two sectors’ labor demand and commodity supply:
Li = Li(s+ p), yi = yi(s+ p), for i = 1, 2. (5)
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A representative consumer in the home country has a well-behaved utility
function u(x1, x2) where xi is demand for commodity i. Both commodities are
assumed to be normal and hence the home demand functions
xi = Di(t+ p, Y ), i = 1, 2, (6)
satisfy
DiY (≡ ∂Di/∂Y ) > 0 for i = 1, 2, (7)
where
Y ≡ y1 + (s+ p)y2 − T,
T ≡ sy2 − tx2.
Similarly, the foreign supply, demand and excess demand functions of commodity
i(= 1, 2) are respectively
y∗i = y∗i (p),
x∗i = x∗i (p) = D∗i (p, Y ∗) where Y ∗ ≡ y∗1(p) + py∗2(p),
z∗i = z∗i (p) = x∗i (p)− y∗i (p). (8)
The international market-clearing condition for commodity 2 is
D2(t+ p, Y ) +D
∗
2(p, Y
∗)− y2(s+ p)− y∗2(p) = 0. (9)
Note that with Walras’ law the market-clearing condition for commodity 1 nec-
essarily holds if all the other markets are in equilibrium.
From (1)—(9) we obtain
dy2 = y
0
2d(s+ p),
(1− tD2Y )dx2 = D2pd(p+ t) +D2Y · [(y01 + py02)d(s+ p) + y2dp+ x2dt] ,
Ωdp = −
µ
D2p
1− tD2Y +
D2Y
1− tD2Y x2
¶
dt+
µ
sD2Y
1− tD2Y + 1
¶
y02ds, (10)
where D2p ≡ ∂D2/∂(p+ t) and Ω satisfies.
Ω ≡ D2p
1− tD2Y +
D2Y
1− tD2Y (y2 − sy
0
2) + z
∗0
2 − y02 < 0,
z∗02 = D∗2p +D∗2Y ∗y∗2 − y∗02 < 0,
y02 > 0,
y∗02 > 0. (11)
The negativity of Ω implies the stability condition of the market of commodity
2, whereas the positivity of y02 and that of y
∗0
2 represent positively-inclined home
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and foreign supply functions of commodity 2.3 z∗02 is naturally assumed to be
negative since it represents the own-price effect of z∗2, the foreign excess demand
for commodity 2. Since the foreign country exports commodity 2, from (8) and
(9) we find
z∗2 = x∗2 − y∗2 = − (x2 − y2) < 0. (12)
The optimal household behavior yields
u2
u1
= t+ p, (13)
where ui ≡ ∂u(x1, x2)/∂xi. From (1), (2) and (4), the optimal firm behavior gives
dy1 + (s+ p)dy2 = 0. (14)
Total differentiation of the balance of payment equation provides
dx1 + pdx2 + x2dp = dy1 + pdy2 + y2dp. (15)
Using these three equations and the total differentiation of u(x1, x2) we find
du
u1
= − (x2 − y2) dp+ tdx2 − sdy2. (16)
Substituting dp, dx2 and dy2 given in (10) into (16) leads to
(1− tD2Y )
u1
du = (t− Λ)h2dt+ [(sD2Y + 1− tD2Y )Λ− s] y02ds, (17)
where
h2 ≡ D2p +D2Y x2 < 0, (18)
Λ ≡ −(x2 − y2) + th2 − sy
0
2
(1− tD2Y )Ω . (19)
Note that h2 in (18), which is the Hicksian own-price effect, is naturally assumed
to be negative. By partially differentiating with respect to Y the home budget
constraint:
Y = D1(t+ p, Y ) + (t+ p)D2(t+ p, Y ),
and using (7), we find
1− tD2Y = D1Y + pD2Y > 0. (20)
3>From (1), (3) and (5), y02 obtains as a function of k
0
2 and L
0
2. Totally differentiating (2)
yields k01 and k02. Substituting them into the total differentiation of (4) gives L02. By applying k02
and L02 thus obtained to the expression of y02 and using (2) we eventually find y02 to be positive.
The positivity of y∗02 > 0 analogously obtains.
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3 Optimal Commodity Tax and Production Sub-
sidy
Having set up the model we now turn to analyze the properties of the optimal
commodity tax and the production subsidy.
From (17) and (19) we obtain the effects of changes in s and t on utility u.
Applying the sign properties of (11), (12), (18) and (20) to the results yieldsµ
1
u1
¶
du
dt
¯¯¯¯
t=0, s=const.
=
µ
1
Ω
¶
[(x2 − y2) + sy02]h2 > 0,µ
1
u1
¶
du
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=0, t=const.
=
∙
1
(1− tD2Y )Ω
¸
[−(x2 − y2) + th2] y02 > 0.
Therefore, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (i) Offering a low production subsidy to the import-competing
sector improves welfare when a non-negative commodity tax is imposed on the
sector, and (ii) imposing a low commodity tax on the sector improves welfare
when a non-negative production subsidy is offered to the sector.
This proposition shows that offering a low production subsidy to the import-
competing sector still improves welfare even if a commodity tax above the optimal
tariff level has already been imposed on the sector, and that imposing a low
commodity tax on the sector still improves welfare even if a production subsidy
above the optimal tariff level has already been offered to the sector. Thus, the
optimal tariff implication (namely, the positive effect of an improvement in the
terms of trade through an import restriction) still holds for a low production
subsidy irrespective of the level of the predetermined commodity tax, and for
a low commodity tax irrespective of the level of the predetermined production
subsidy.
Let us next turn to the optimal combination of the commodity tax and the
production subsidy. From (17) they satisfy
t = Λ, s = (1− tD2Y )Λ/ (1−D2YΛ) ,
and hence using (11), (12) and (19) we obtain
topt = sopt = Φ, Φ ≡ z∗2/z∗02 > 0, (21)
where z∗02 and z∗2 are respectively given by (11) and (12) and Φ is equivalent to
the optimal tariff.4 This property is formally restated as follows:
4Bhagwati (1971) intuitively discusses this property but does not give a formal proof.
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Proposition 2. The optimal combination of the commodity tax and the produc-
tion subsidy is equivalent to the optimal tariff.
Noting that a tariff is equivalent to the combination of production subsidy
s and commodity tax t that have the same magnitude as the tariff, we next
consider the case where the tariff is separated into the production subsidy and
the commodity tax and only the commodity tax is revised while the production
subsidy is maintained in order for the import-competing sector to be protected.
For example, Japan currently imposes a 778% tariff rate on imported rice and
most likely the tariff rate exceeds the optimal tariff level. Replacing the tariff by
the production subsidy is often discussed and in fact the Japanese government
has adopted an individual income support system in the agriculture sector. In
the following we will show that the separation benefits the country.
Suppose that initially
t = s. (22)
Then, Ω and z∗02 in (11) and Λ in (19) satisfy
t− Λ = (t− Φ)
µ
z∗02
Ω
¶
, (23)
and hence (17) reduces to
(1− tD2Y )
u1
du = (t−Φ)
µ
z∗02
Ω
¶
(h2dt− y02ds) . (24)
From (11), (18), (20), (22) and (24), if s is fixed at a higher level than Φ,
du
dt
¯¯¯¯
t=s(>Φ)
< 0. (25)
Next, when t decreases from s and reaches Φ, using (11) and (19) we obtain
t− Λ = (s− Φ)
µ
y02
Ω
¶
. (26)
Substituting this into t− Λ in (17) where s(> Φ) is kept constant yields
(1− tD2Y )
u1
du = (s−Φ)
µ
h2y
0
2
Ω
¶
dt. (27)
From (10), (11) and (20), the above expression shows
du
dt
¯¯¯¯
t=Φ
> 0. (28)
(25) and (28) imply the following proposition.
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Proposition 3. Suppose that a tariff higher than the optimal tariff is initially
imposed. If the tariff is separated into a production subsidy and a commodity tax
and the production subsidy must take the same level as the tariff, the optimal
commodity tax is between the initial level and the optimal tariff level.
4 Production Support and Environmental Preser-
vation
4.1 Production Support Policy
This section considers the case where the tariff is replaced by the production
subsidy with the commodity tax adjusted so that production of commodity 2
is kept constant. The Japanese individual income support for farmers is in-
deed distributed according to the past crop average. It should be noted that a
production-keeping policy is equivalent to a price-keeping policy in the present
setting. The US Counter-Cyclical Payment (CCP), which compensates the dif-
ference between the market price and the target price, may be an example of the
price-keeping policy.
Let us start the analysis from the situation of (22) and obtain the welfare
effect of the above-mentioned policy. If y2 is fixed and hence dy2 = 0, from (5)
we obtain
0 = ds+ dp.
Applying this property and (18) to (10) leads to
ds = θdt where θ ≡ h2
(1− tD2Y )Ω+ y02 . (29)
From (11) and (22), θ is rewritten as
θ = h2
h2 −D2Y · (x2 − y2) + (1− tD2Y ) z∗02 ,
and therefore using (7), the second property of (11), (12), (18) and (20), we find
0 < θ < 1. (30)
From the second property of (11), (24) and (30), a small change in the commodity
tax with the production subsidy following (29) yieldsµ
1
u1
¶
du
dt
¯¯¯¯
y2=const.
= (t− Φ) z∗02 θ < 0.
This property implies the following:
8
Proposition 4. Suppose that initially s = t > Φ. Then, a reduction in the
commodity tax t accompanied by a reduction in the production subsidy s that
keeps production of commodity 2 constant improves welfare.
Intuitively, a decrease in the commodity tax stimulates demand for commodity
2, which increases its home producer price. Thus, in order to keep the home
production of commodity 2 constant the production subsidy must also be reduced.
(11), (20), (22) and (24) imply that when t is kept constant, du/ds satisfies
du
ds
¯¯¯¯
s=t(>Φ)
< 0,
i.e., a reduction in the production subsidy increases home welfare. (25) shows
that a reduction in the commodity tax also increases home welfare. Therefore,
the decrease in the commodity tax and the subsequent decrease in the production
subsidy, mentioned in the proposition, makes the home country better off.
Moreover, from (29) and (30), the subsequent reduction in s that keeps y2
constant is smaller than the initial reduction in t. Therefore, the beneficial tax
reform is indeed a separation of the tariff to the commodity tax and the produc-
tion subsidy.
4.2 Environmental Preservation
This section considers the case with positive production externality, such as envi-
ronmental preservation owing to agricultural production. The WTO agreement
on agriculture allows member countries to give a subsidy to agricultural sectors for
environmental preservation or maintenance of areas under cultivation. It is paid
according to the past production level and hence is indeed a production subsidy.
In this section, we examine how an externality affects the optimal commodity tax
and the optimal production subsidy.5
To do so, we modify the utility function as
u(x1, x2) + βy2,
where β(> 0) shows such externality. For given β, totally differentiating the
utility and applying (13), (14) and (15) to the result yields
du
u1
= dx1 + (t+ p)dx2 + βdy2 = −(x2 − y2)dp+ tdx2 − (s− β)dy2.
5Markusen (1975, p.19) analyzes the optimal combination of a tariff, instead of a commodity
tax, and a production tax in the presence of externality.
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Using (10) and (11), we rewrite it as follows:
(1− tD2Y )
u1
du =
µ
t− Λ− βy
0
2
Ω
¶
h2dt+ [(sD2Y + 1− tD2Y )Λ− s
+ {D2p +D2Y y2 + (1− tD2Y ) z∗02 }
µβ
Ω
¶¸
y02ds. (31)
Therefore, the optimal tax and the optimal subsidy must satisfy
topt − Λ− βy
0
2
Ω = 0,
(soptD2Y + 1− toptD2Y )Λ− sopt + £D2p +D2Y y2 + ¡1− toptD2Y ¢ z∗02 ¤µβΩ
¶
= 0.
From these two equations in which Ω and Λ are respectively given by (11) and
(19), we obtain the optimal tax and subsidy mentioned below.
Proposition 5. In the presence of production externality β the optimal tax and
the optimal subsidy are
topt = Φ, sopt = Φ+ β,
where Φ ≡ z∗2(p)/z∗02 (p).
By comparing the equations in proposition 5 with (21) we find that without
externality β the implication of proposition 5 is the same as that of proposition
2, that is, the optimal combination of the production subsidy and the commodity
tax is equivalent to the optimal tariff Φ. In the presence of externality β, however,
the production subsidy must be higher than the commodity tax by the magnitude
of the externality.
The existence of the externality strengthens the benefit of separating the tariff
into the production subsidy and the commodity tax and lowering the commodity
tax only. In fact, from (23), (26) and (31) we obtain
(1− tD2Y )
u1
du
dt
¯¯¯¯
t=s
= (t−Φ)
µ
z∗02 h2
Ω
¶
− β
µ
h2y
0
2
Ω
¶
, (32)
(1− tD2Y )
u1
du
dt
¯¯¯¯
t=Φ
= [s− (Φ+ β)]
µ
h2y
0
2
Ω
¶
. (33)
Obviously, −βh2y02/Ω, which is negative from (11) and (18), represents the ex-
ternality effect, which enhances the benefit of a reduction in the commodity tax,
shown in proposition 3. By comparing them with (24) and (27) respectively, we
find that (32) is negative and that (33) is positive. Thus, if the production sub-
sidy is higher than the first-best optimal level Φ+β, the optimal commodity tax
is between s and Φ —i.e., basically the same implication as proposition 3 holds.
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Proposition 6. If a country must offer a higher production subsidy than the
first-best optimal level, the optimal commodity tax is between the level of the
production subsidy and its own first-best optimal level.
Next, we examine the effect of a change in β on sopt and topt. Noting that Φ
depends only on p, from the equations in proposition 5 we find
dtopt = Φ0dp, dsopt = dβ + Φ0dp, (34)
where Φ0 = dΦ/dp. Applying the property that sopt − topt = β, stated in propo-
sition 5, and the above equations to the last equation of (10) yields
dtopt
dβ =
(βD2Y + 1) y02Φ0
(1− toptD2Y )Ω+ h2Φ0 − (βD2Y + 1) y02Φ0 .
From (11), (18), (20), (34) and the above equation, we obtain
−1 < dt
opt
dβ < 0 and 0 <
dsopt
dβ < 1 if Φ
0 > 0.
Therefore, if Φ0 > 0, as externality β is larger, the optimal commodity tax de-
creases and the optimal production subsidy increases but the magnitudes of the
changes are less than the magnitude of the increase in the externality. Moreover,
using (21) we find Φ0 to satisfy
Φ0 = (z
∗0
2 )
2 − z∗2z∗002
(z∗02 )2
> 0 if (z∗02 )2 > z∗2z∗002 .
Since z∗2(= x∗2 − y∗2) < 0 as shown in (12), the above condition is valid if z∗002 ≥ 0,
that is, if the foreign excess demand for commodity 2 is non-convex with respect
to the price.
The above results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 7. Suppose that (z∗02 )2 > z∗2z∗002 , which holds when the foreign excess
demand of commodity 2 is non-convex, and that production of commodity 2 yields
positive externality, e.g. environmental preservation. If the externality expands,
the optimal production subsidy increases and the magnitude of the increase is less
than the expansion of the externality. The optimal commodity tax decreases and
the magnitude of the decrease is less than the expansion of the externality.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the welfare effects of separating a protective tariff to a
production subsidy to, and a commodity tax on, the protected sector in various
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plausible situations, including the cases where (i) the initial tariff is set above
the optimal tariff, (ii) domestic production of the protected commodity must
be maintained, and (iii) there is positive externality of the sector’s domestic
production. We show that separating a protective tariff to a commodity tax
and a production subsidy and lowering only the commodity tax makes the home
country better off in these situations. Without any distortion of such, however,
the optimal combination of the subsidy and the tax is equivalent to the optimal
tariff.
In Japan there are recently lively debates on the forms of protection policies
for several agricultural products on which very high protective tariffs are imposed.
EU and Switzerland have increased the amount of direct payment to agricultural
sectors while reducing tariffs (or market price supports) on agricultural products
(OECD, 2010). The present results imply that a shift from a tariff to the combi-
nation of a production subsidy and a commodity tax benefits the country if the
sector must be protected.
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